SSD Advisory – Bitdefender Code Signing organizationName Buffer Overflow

Vulnerability Summary
The following advisory describes a Buffer Overflow vulnerability found in Bitdefender Engine PE.
Bitdefender provides the Bitdefender “antimalware” engine for integration with other security vendors products. The engine is used in Bitdefender’s own products, for example in Bitdefender Internet Security 2017 and below. The antimalware engine is the core of the product, among other features providing the means to scan potentially malicious portable executables (PEs).
An independent security researcher, Pagefault, has reported this vulnerability to Beyond Security’s SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure program.
Vendor Response
Bitdefender has released patched to address this vulnerability in version 7.71417.

Vulnerability Details
A PE file can be signed using X.509 certificates. The certificates can ensure that the content of the executable has not been altered and that the executable comes from a trusted source.
Certificates are embedded inside one of the PE data directories defined via IMAGE_NT_HEADERS.IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER.
The IMAGE_NT_HEADERS structure inside a PE file starts with the “PE\0\0” signature:

typedef struct _IMAGE_NT_HEADERS {
    DWORD Signature; "PE\0\0"

The IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER structure contains several DataDirectory IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY structures inside its last fields:

WORD					Magic
BYTE					MajorLinkerVersion
DWORD					LoaderFlags
DWORD 					NumberOfRvaAndSizes
typedef struct _IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY {
    DWORD   VirtualAddress;     // RVA of the data
    DWORD   Size;               // Size of the data

DataDirectory[4] represents IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY, and points to a list of WIN_CERTIFICATE structures. The VirtualAddress field is a file offset, rather than an RVA.
The WIN_CERTIFICATE structures is defined as follows:

typedef struct _WIN_CERTIFICATE {
  DWORD dwLength;
  WORD  wRevision;
  WORD  wCertificateType;
  BYTE  bCertificate[ANYSIZE_ARRAY];

vsserv.exe is the Bitdefender system service. The process scans PEs automatically, analyzing digital signatures through the cevakrnl.rv8 module. The module is located in a compressed form under “%ProgramFiles%\Common Files\Bitdefender\Bitdefender Threat Scanner\Antivirus_…\Plugins\“.
cevakrnl.rv8 is unpacked and loaded as executable code on service startup. cevakrnl.rv8!sub_40ACFF0() is called when a signed PE is encountered.

cevakrnl.rv8:040AE691                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_2C]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AE694                 push    eax             ; &(ebp-0x2C) - object placed on the stack
cevakrnl.rv8:040AE695                 call    sub_40ACFF0     ; call here
cevakrnl.rv8!sub_40ACFF0() extracts the IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY offset and size fields.
cevakrnl.rv8:040ACFF0 sub_40ACFF0     proc near               ; CODE XREF: sub_40AE5C0+D5p
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD007                 mov     edi, [ebp+arg_0]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD025                 mov     eax, [edi+4]    ; eax = IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD025                                         ; contains at
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD025                                         ; offset  0x0: DWORD Signature ("PE");
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD025                                         ; offset  0x4: IMAGE_FILE_HEADER FileHeader;
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD025                                         ; offset 0x18: IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER32 OptionalHeader;
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD028                 mov     [ebp+arg_0_bkup], edi
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD02E                 mov     [ebp+numofcrcs], ecx
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD034                 mov     [ebp+var_1F0], ecx
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD03A                 mov     esi, [eax+9Ch]  ; attribute certificate size
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD03A                                         ; OptionalHeader.DataDirectory+0x24
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD03A                                         ; = IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY.Size
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD040                 mov     edx, [eax+98h]  ; attribute certificate offset
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD040                                         ; OptionalHeader.DataDirectory+0x20
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD040                                         ; = IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY.Offset
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD040                                         ; "Points to a list of WIN_CERTIFICATE structures, defined in WinTrust.H"

A maximum number of 0x2400 bytes is then read from the defined offset into a heap buffer.

cevakrnl.rv8:040AD092                 cmp     esi, 2400h      ; maximum size
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD098                 jbe     short @max
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD09A                 mov     esi, 2400h
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD09F @max:                                   ; CODE XREF: sub_40ACFF0+A8j
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0C4                 lea     eax, [ebp+var_1C4]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0CA                 push    eax             ; int
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0CB                 push    esi             ; size
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0CC loc_40AD0CC:                            ; CODE XREF: sub_40ACFF0+CEj
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0CC                 mov     ebx, [ebp+buf]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0D2                 mov     edi, [ebp+arg_0_bkup]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0D8                 push    ebx             ; buf
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0D9                 push    edx             ; offset
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0DA                 push    edi             ; int
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0DB                 call    readatoffset    ; read all structures
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0DB                                         ;   typedef struct _WIN_CERTIFICATE {
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0DB                                         ;     DWORD dwLength;
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0DB                                         ;     WORD wRevision;
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0DB                                         ;     WORD wCertificateType;
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0DB                                         ;     BYTE bCertificate[ANYSIZE_ARRAY];
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD0DB                                         ;   } WIN_CERTIFICATE,*LPWIN_CERTIFICATE;

After additional irrelevant operations, Bitdefender starts searching for X.509 “organizationName” attributes in encountered data. The attributes are located by searching for the 0x0A045503 dword, which is the ASN.1 representation of the organizationName OID

cevakrnl.rv8:040AD320 @startloop:                             ; CODE XREF: sub_40ACFF0+326j
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD320                                         ; sub_40ACFF0+728j
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD320                 mov     ecx, [ebp+buf]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD326                 mov     eax, [ecx+esi]  ; current dword
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD329                 lea     ebx, [ecx+esi]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD32C                 mov     [ebp+var_208], ebx
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD332                 cmp     eax, 0A045503h  ; 55:04:0A = X.509 "id-at-organizationName" attribute
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD337                 jz      short @found

When an “organizationName” is found, its corresponding value string is passed in a call to a CRC32-computing function. The function returns the inverted (bitwise NOT) CRC32 sum of the string.
Please note that only printable ASCII (0x20-0x7E) characters are considered valid in “organizationName“.

cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3B8 @found:                                 ; CODE XREF: sub_40ACFF0+347j
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3B8                                         ; sub_40ACFF0+357j
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3B8                 mov     bl, [ecx+esi+5] ; value string length
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3BC                 movzx   eax, bl
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3BF                 mov     [ebp+var_20C], eax
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3C5                 add     eax, 6
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3C8                 add     eax, esi
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3CA                 mov     [ebp+var_1E8], 0
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3D4                 mov     [ebp+var_40], 0
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3D8                 mov     [ebp+savedcrc], 0
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD3E2                 mov     [ebp+after_value_string], eax ; offset to next data
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD444                 mov     eax, [ebp+buf]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD44A                 add     eax, 6
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD44D                 mov     [ebp+edi+var_40], 0
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD452                 add     eax, esi        ; offset + 6
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD452                                         ; points to value string
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD454                 push    edi             ; length of string
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD455                 push    eax             ; Organization in certificate
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD456                 call    crc32           ; crc32
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD45B                 add     esp, 8          ; this returns ~crc32
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD45B                                         ; ~crc32("31TZnp") = 0xdeadbeef

If the CRC was not previously encountered:

cevakrnl.rv8:040AD480 @checkduplicate:                        ; CODE XREF: sub_40ACFF0+488j
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD480                                         ; sub_40ACFF0+4A0j
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD480                 cmp     [ebp+ecx*4+crc32results], eax ; array of already saved CRCs
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD487                 jz      @duplicate
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD48D                 inc     ecx
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD48E                 cmp     ecx, ebx
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD490                 jb      short @checkduplicate 

its value is placed inside a local stack array of 8 dwords. The index of the array is increased for each unique CRC without checking the array limit. This results in a stack-based buffer overflow if an overly large number of unique “organizationName” values are encountered.

-000001B8 crc32results    dd 8 dup(?)
-00000198 var_198         db 256 dup(?)
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD51E                 mov     eax, [ebp+savedcrc]
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD524                 mov     [ebp+ebx*4+crc32results], eax ; buffer overflow
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD524                                         ; [ebp+ebx*4-0x1B8] = eax
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD52B                 inc     ebx
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD52C                 mov     [ebp+numofcrcs], ebx

The vulnerability allows overwriting a large number of stack bytes with arbitrary data. The data written to the stack is arbitrary due to the ability to find an ASCII string for any desired CRC result by reversing the CRC32 algorithm.
Although the vulnerable function contains a cookie check on return, code execution is believed possible due to the use of an object placed on the stack prior to function return.
The object is passed to the vulnerable function as the first argument, and the field at offset 0x1C (changed to 0xdeadbeef via the PoC) is passed to global_function0().

cevakrnl.rv8:040AD750                 mov     ebx, [ebp+arg_0_bkup] ; ebx points to the stack of the caller function,
																	; which is above crc32results
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD785                 push    0
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD787                 push    1
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD789                 push    41C40Eh
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD78E                 push    6
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD790                 push    dword ptr [ebx+1Ch] ; corrupted
cevakrnl.rv8:040AD793                 call    global_function0

global_function0() calls sub_2F70B90(), passing [0xdeadbeef+0x22C] as the current object.

seg001:02F5D69F                 mov     ecx, [ecx+22Ch] ; crash here
seg001:02F5D69F                                         ; ecx is controlled
seg001:02F5D6A5                 push    [ebp+arg_4]
seg001:02F5D6A8                 call    sub_2F70B90

sub_2F70B90() extracts a dword from the current object pointer

seg001:02F70BFA                 mov     edi, [esi+eax*4] ; eax - fixed offset = 0x560

eventually passing it as the current object to sub_2F6F120()

seg001:02F70D45                 mov     ecx, edi
seg001:02F70D47                 call    sub_2F6F120

sub_2F6F120() eventually extracts a dword from the potentially arbitrary pointer, resulting in a jump to an arbitrary address.

seg001:02F6F132                 mov     eax, [edi+4]
seg001:02F6F135                 push    ebx
seg001:02F6F136                 push    dword ptr [esi+4]
seg001:02F6F139                 push    edi
seg001:02F6F13A                 call    eax

The ability to jump to an arbitrary address depends on the ability to place controlled content at a fixed address. Heap spraying could be used for this purpose. This is believed achievable due to the complexity of the Bitdefender engine.


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